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NOTE
Looking for Mr. Bobb: Equal Protection
and Gender-Based Discrimination in
Bobb v. Municipal Court
By Karen A. Wells*
Introduction
In Bobb v. Municipal Court,' the California Court of Appeal2 over-
turned a judgment of contempt' entered against Carolyn Bobb, a pro-
spective juror who refused to answer questions during voir dire4 about
her marital status and husband's occupation.' Only women were asked
these questions.6 The judge asked Carolyn Bobb "Do you have a Mr.
Bobb-is there a Mr. Bobb?" and "What is your husband's occupa-
tion?"7 One appellate justice held that the questions violated equal pro-
tection of the law' as guaranteed by the California Constitution9 and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.10 Another
justice concurred in the judgment, but did not reach the equal protection
* B.A., 1965, Southwestern Oklahoma State University; M.A., 1967, University of
Oklahoma; member, third year class.
1. 143 Cal. App. 3d 860, 192 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1983).
2. The California Supreme Court is the state's highest court. The California Court of
Appeal, an intermediate appellate court, is divided into six districts, which are further subdi-
vided into divisions. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-3. This Note analyzes a decision of the Court
of Appeal, First District, Division Two.
3. The judgment of contempt was entered by the municipal court and later affirmed by
the superior court for Monterey County, Salinas Division. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 192 Cal.
Rptr. at 271.
4. The phrase "voir dire," literally "to speak the truth," "denotes the preliminary exami-
nation which the court may make of one presented as a witness or juror, where his compe-
tency, interest, etc. is objected to." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979).
5. See infra note 14.
6. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
7. Id. at 862-63, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270-71.
8. See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
9. For the text of the relevant provisions of the California Constitution, see infra note 34.
10. For the text of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see
infra note 35.
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issue.II A third justice found that no constitutional issue was involved. 12
The California Supreme Court denied a hearing.1 3
This Note evaluates the approaches taken by the three appellate jus-
tices in Bobb v. Municipal Court. These approaches demonstrate that
judicial sensitivity to gender discrimination may be important to the out-
come of equal protection challenges.
Part I summarizes the facts of Bobb and reviews the three opinions.
The next two parts trace the historical development of the equal protec-
tion guarantee as it relates to gender-based discrimination, first under the
United States Constitution and then under the California Constitution.
This historical overview continues with a discussion of gender-based dis-
crimination issues raised in California appellate courts since 1971 and
concludes with further examination of Bobb. Finally, part IV evaluates
the role of judicial sensitivity in equal protection analysis in gender-based
discrimination cases and argues for greater sensitivity and continued
strict scrutiny in these cases.
I. Bobb v. Municipal Court
A. The Facts
Carolyn Bobb, an attorney, appeared for jury duty in Monterey
County, California, on January 26, 1982. As the municipal court judge
conducted voir dire, Bobb noticed that he questioned only women jurors
about their marital status and their spouses' occupations. When she was
called to the jury box as a prospective juror, Bobb refused to answer
these questions. 14
11. See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
13. An order of the California Supreme Court denying a petition for transfer to that court
after a decision by a court of appeal "may be taken as an approval of the conclusion there
reached, but not necessarily of all of the reasoning contained in that opinion." Eisenberg v.
Superior Court, 193 Cal. 575, 578, 226 P. 617, 618 (1924).
14. The voir dire, conducted by the trial judge, proceeded as follows:
The Court: Miss Bobb, what is your occupation?
Miss Bobb: I'm an attorney.
The Court: And in your practice do you practice criminal law as well as civil law?
Miss Bobb: No, I practice entirely bankruptcy law.
The Court: All right. Is there a Mr. Bobb?
Miss Bobb: I have some difficulty with that question because I've noticed only the
women have been asked to answer that.
The Court: Yes, I know. Do you have a Mr. Bobb-is there a Mr. Bobb?
Miss Bobb: Are you going to pool [sic] the men to see if they care to disclose-
The Court: No, I'm just going to ask you if you have a husband or not. Do you have
a husband?
Miss Bobb: I don't care to answer it then. What's relative to women is relative to
men.
The Court: Yes, I know. What is your husband's occupation?
Miss Bobb: I don't care to answer that.
The Court: I instruct you to answer.
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After a brief colloquy, the judge held Bobb in contempt of court,
and she was taken to a holding facility. Approximately fifteen minutes
later, she was released on her own recognizance, on the condition that
she return to court for sentencing.15 At the hearing that afternoon, Bobb
requested a continuance in order to obtain counsel and to do research.16
The court denied the continuance. Bobb then attempted to explain her
objections to the court's questioning. 7 Although the judge acknowl-
edged her sincerity, he repeated his belief that the questions were valid
and held that Bobb's refusal to answer the questions constituted con-
tempt of court.' 8 He then sentenced her to one day in jail.' 9
Miss Bobb: I don't think I should.
The Court: I've got-you understand that you'll be in contempt of Court-jury-
you're an attorney, you understand these rules, don't you?
Miss Bobb: No, I do not understand why only the women are asked certain ques-
tions and the men aren't asked the same questions.
The Court: The question to you, Mrs. Bobb-you're an attorney at law, you under-
stand the rules and regulations of-of--of being an attorney. And the question to
you now simply is: What is your husband's occupation?
Miss Bobb: I refuse to answer.
The Court: You're held in contempt of Court, Mrs. Bobb.
143 Cal. App. 3d at 862-63, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270-71.
15. Id. at 863, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
16. Id. It is unclear from the Bobb opinion whether Bobb specified the issues she wished
to research. It may be assumed that she wished to research her right to refuse to answer
discriminatory questions. Since Bobb apparently had been released late in the morning and the
afternoon hearing took place at 3:00 p.m., she had little time for research. Id.
17. Id. These portions of Bobb's explanations at the sentencing hearing were set forth in
Presiding Justice Kline's opinion:
What I was objecting to. . . was the inference. . . that [women] would be influ-
enced by their spouse and the men, on the other hand,. .. wouldn't be influenced by
their spouses because you had no questions of any man.. . as to what their spouses
did. And, I felt this line drawn between the men and women prospective jurors this
morning very, very strongly. And I was hoping I wouldn't be called. . . to the jury
box because I knew I would have to object. I had wanted to keep my objections to
possibly a letter to you afterwards, but, unfortunately, when my name was called and
I had to go forth and answer the questions, I had to decide whether I was going to
participate in this or not and I elected not to and I don't feel as a citizen I have to
.... I did not come in here to make a statement. I'm not known for my espousal
of erratical [sic] causes. All I know is it just hurt my gut. And that's why I took the
stand I did.
Id. at 871, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77 (Kline, J., concurring) (ellipses in original).
18. Id. at 863, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271. The responses of the municipal court judge included
these statements:
I think you're honest about that and-that does give me some feelings for this too. If
you were a person who just thumbed their nose at authority, just flat because it's
authority, then I would see it a different way. But I don't see it in that way with you.
I think you're a woman of high principles and an attorney of high principles and that
you've done this feeling that, in your own mind, justifiably, that you were going to
make a stand and you did make the stand. . . . You raise no grounds-no reason
why you should not answer those questions-any constitutional reasons that would
tend to incriminate you or any such privilege you may have. Consequently, the
Court had no alternative but to feel that you were directly opposed to answer the
question by your own will. You just did not want to answer the question. You
weren't going to. And that's contemptuous of the Court's power . . . . I under-
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Bobb petitioned the superior court for a writ of certiorari and re-
quested that the order of the municipal court be annulled and set aside.
The superior court denied the petition and affirmed the municipal court's
contempt judgment.2 ° Bobb then appealed. The California Court of Ap-
peal reversed the judgment of contempt on June 14, 1983.21
B. Justice Miller's Opinion: Embracing Equal Protection Analysis
On appeal, Bobb argued "that the questions put to her, when admin-
istered in a gender-neutral context, were constitutionally valid."22 How-
ever, she contended that when the questions were posed as part of a
discriminatory pattern, they constituted a denial of equal protection.23
Bobb reasoned that the municipal court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
ordered her to answer the questions. She therefore maintained that she
did not act in contempt of court when she refused to obey the municipal
court's unconstitutional order.24 Bobb cited several cases in which the
United States Supreme Court reversed contempt citations that were
based on unconstitutional court orders.25 Although the Monterey supe-
rior court found these cases "inapposite" to Bobb's situation, on appeal
stand your position, as a matter of fact, I agree with your position, and have all
along."
Id. at 871-72, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (Kline, J., concurring) (ellipses in original).
19. Id. at 863, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
20. Id. (Superior Court of Monterey County, No. 77832, Edmund J. Leach, Jr.).
21. Id. at 860, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
22. Id. at 863-64, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
23. Id. Bobb cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in which the Court struck
down San Francisco ordinances which made it unlawful to operate laundries without the city's
consent except in brick or stone buildings. Approximately 240 out of San Francisco's 320
laundries were owned by Chinese aliens and about 310 of the 320 were constructed of wood.
Id. at 358-59. The facts established "an administration directed so exclusively against a partic-
ular class of persons" as to require a conclusion that, whatever the intent behind the ordi-
nances, they were applied with "a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical
denial by the State" of equal protection. Id. at 373.
Bobb's argument demonstrates a basic element of equal protection analysis: the require-
ment of some form of discrimination (unequal treatment of similarly situated persons or
groups). Discrimination is a "failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinc-
tion can be found between those favored and those not favored." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
420 (5th ed. 1979). See infra notes 117 & 121-22 and accompanying text. If the judge had
asked the potential jurors of both sexes the same questions about marital status and spouse's
occupation, no discrimination would have occurred.
24. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
25. Id. Bobb cited: Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (per curiam), rev'g Ex
parte Hamilton, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963)
(per curiam) (reversing a conviction of contempt for a black man's refusal to comply with a
judge's instructions to sit in the section of the courtroom reserved for blacks); In re Berry, 68
Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968) (granting a writ of habeas corpus to release
four persons charged with criminal contempt for violating a temporary restraining order which
forbade union picketing activity).
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Justice Miller considered them "directly on point." 26
Justice Miller found the facts in Hamilton v. Alabama27 "the most
analogous" to the situation confronting Bobb.28 In Hamilton, a black
woman was called on her own behalf at a hearing on a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. She refused to answer questions on cross-examination be-
cause the examining attorney addressed her as "Mary" instead of "Miss
Hamilton."29 The municipal court judge held her in contempt, fined her,
and sentenced her to five days in jail.3" The conviction was later reversed
by the United States Supreme Court.31 Justice Miller agreed with Bobb's
argument, based on Hamilton and similar cases, that "a court which is-
sues an unconstitutional order acts in excess of its jurisdiction and, ac-
cordingly, there is no contempt of court on the part of one who refuses to
obey such an order." 32
Justice Miller then analyzed the Bobb facts to determine whether
the municipal court's contempt order violated equal protection princi-
ples.33 After acknowledging that the relevant provisions of the Califor-
26. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
27. Ex parte Hamilton, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963), rev'd sub nom. Hamilton v.
Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (per curiam).
28. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
29. The cross-examination of Mary Hamilton was as follows:
Q What is your name, please?
A Miss Mary Hamilton.
Q Mary, I believe-you were arrested-who were you arrested by?
A My name is Mary Hamilton. Please address me correctly.
Q Who were you arrested by, Mary?
A I will not answer a question-
BY ATTORNEY AMAKER: The witness's name is Miss Hamilton.
A -your question until I am addressed correctly.
THE COURT: Answer the question.
THE WITNESS: I will not answer them unless I am addressed correctly.
THE COURT: You are in contempt of court-
ATTORNEY CONLEY: Your Honor-your Honor-
THE COURT: You are in contempt of this court, and you are sentenced to five days
in jail and a fifty dollar fine.
275 Ala. 574, 574, 156 So. 2d 926, 926 (1963).
30. Id.
31. 376 U.S. 650 (1964). The Court's per curiam disposition consisted of this brief an-
nouncement, not accompanied by a full opinion: "The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.
The judgment is reversed. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61." In Johnson, the Court had re-
versed, on equal protection grounds, a contempt citation for a spectator's refusal to comply
with a judge's order to move to a section of the courtroom reserved for blacks. The Hamilton
majority apparently relied on Johnson to show: (1) a court order based on a denial of equal
protection of the laws is unconstitutional; and (2) a person who refuses to obey such an order
cannot be held in contempt merely for the refusal. Justice Black's concurrence in Hamilton
cited four cases reversing contempt convictions on due process grounds. 376 U.S. at 650
(Black, J., concurring). Three Justices would have denied certiorari in Hamilton. Id. at 650
(Clark, Harlan, & White, JJ., dissenting).
32. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
33. Id. at 864-65, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272. Justice Miller went directly to the "standard of
review" issue. He did not analyze threshold issues that were not before the court: whether
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nia Constitution34 are substantially equivalent to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,35 he noted that the California provisions "'are possessed of an in-
dependent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analysis
different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable.' ,36 Bobb presented this type of case, for California equal
protection provisions demand "a standard of review different from that
applied by federal courts37 under the Fourteenth Amendment in cases
state action was involved; whether there was discrimination between persons who were simi-
larly situated; and whether plaintiff was a member of a suspect class.
The facts of Bobb clearly establish the presence of state action since, for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes, state action "refers to exertions of state power in all forms." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). "State judicial action is as clearly 'state' action as state admin-
istrative action." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The municipal court judge in Bobb did not deny that he had differentiated between wo-
men and men during voir dire. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270. The state
apparently did not argue that potential female jurors and potential male jurors were not simi-
larly situated. Finally, Carolyn Bobb, as a woman, was obviously a member of a suspect class
under California law. See infra notes 117-22 & 168-73 and accompanying text.
34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7: "(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws. . . ; (b) A citizen or
class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to
all citizens."
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
36. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d
728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)).
In Serrano, the California Supreme Court noted that, as to fundamental civil liberties, the state
supreme court sits as a court of last resort, "'subject only to the qualification that [its] inter-
pretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal
charter.'" Serrano, 18 Cal. 3d at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (quoting People
v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4
(1975)). California courts will look first to California law. Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority, but are to be followed by
California courts only when they provide no less protection than that guaranteed by California
law. Serrano, 18 Cal. 3d at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
In Serrano, plaintiffs challenged school district funding that was based on assessed prop-
erty values in each district. The court applied strict scrutiny to discrimination in educational
opportunity because, under California law, wealth-based discrimination is a suspect classifica-
tion and education is a fundamental right. Id. at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
367. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for discussion of the doctrine of independ-
ent state grounds.
37. The United States Supreme Court has developed an intermediate tier of analysis for
gender-based discrimination. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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which involve classifications based on gender.""8 The standard of review
in California cases is
the traditional two-tier test of equal protection, [by which] distinc-
tions involving "suspect classifications" or classifications that im-
pair "fundamental rights" will be subjected to strict scrutiny by the
courts, and [by which] the state will be required to bear the heavy
burden of showing both that it has a compelling interest which
justifies the classification and that the classification is necessary to
further that compelling interest.39
Justice Miller quoted extensively' from Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,41 the
pivotal California case which held that gender-based distinctions are sus-
pect classifications subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.42
Justice Miller noted that the California Supreme Court "has consist-
ently reaffirmed" its Sail'er Inn holding and observed that "courts have
consistently held that if a classification involves either a suspect classifi-
38. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864-65, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272. As support for this statement,
Justice Miller cited Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245 (1979). In
Molar, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review and determined that female
inmates of the county jail must be assigned to jail facilities and granted privileges comparable
to those available to male prisoners. Id. at 20, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
39. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 865, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
40. Id. at 865-66, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
41. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (en bane). In Sail'er Inn, the
California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that made it unlawful to hire women
as bartenders. Liquor license holders sued the state agency that administered the statute, argu-
ing that the statute violated the state constitution by barring persons from pursuing a lawful
occupation solely because of gender. The court held that the statute violated equal protection
guarantees:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which the class
members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect
statuses, such as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society. The result is that the whole class is relegated to
an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or characteristics of its indi-
vidual members. Where the relation between characteristic and evil to be prevented
is so tenuous, courts must look closely at classifications based on that characteristic
lest outdated social stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices.
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifications is the stigma of
inferiority and second class citizenship associated with them. Women, like Negroes,
aliens, and the poor have historically labored under severe legal and social
disabilities.
Id. at 18-19, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (citations and footnotes omitted).
42. "The California Supreme Court [in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby] was the first to declare
unequivocally that sex is a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny." Comment, Camp-
ing on Adequate State Grounds." California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals, 9 Sw.
U.L. REv. 1157, 1182 (1977). The California Supreme Court's "unanimous decision in Sail'er
Inn v. Kirby is the most far-reaching state court decision on the subject of sex discrimination,
and seems destined for landmark status." Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A
Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 686 (1971).
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cation or fundamental interest, strict scrutiny must be applied."43 Since
gender-based discrimination is a suspect classification under California
law, Justice Miller rejected the state's contention that, because jury ser-
vice is not a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny standard should not be
applied.44
Applying strict scrutiny to the voir dire of Carolyn Bobb, Justice
Miller found that the questions, as asked, rested on an assumption of
inferiority, much like the assumption of inferiority in Hamilton:
[N]o significant difference can be seen between ordering a witness
to submit to an attorney's imposition of a "relic of slavery" such as
addressing blacks only by their first names, and ordering only fe-
male prospective jurors to announce their marital status and hus-
bands' occupations which is likewise a relic of a bygone age when
women were presumed incapable of independent thought. Both
orders reinforce a stigma of inferiority and second-class
citizenship.45
Justice Miller noted the absence of any compelling state interest for
the classification and held that the lower courts had violated Bobb's right
to equal protection." As a result, he concluded that Bobb was "justified
in her refusal to comply with [the] discriminatory questioning" and that
the contempt judgment should be reversed.47
43. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (emphasis original). Once again, Jus-
tice Miller cited Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979). He pointed out
that minimum security jail facilities and related prisoner privileges were not fundamental
rights, yet the court still applied strict scrutiny because the facilities and privileges were pro-
vided differentially, based upon gender. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866-67, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
Justice Miller also noted that in Inmates of Sybil Brand Institute for Women v. County of Los
Angeles, 130 Cal. App. 3d 89, 102, 181 Cal. Rptr. 599, 605 (1982), the court applied strict
scrutiny to Los Angeles County's differential treatment of female and male prisoners. 143 Cal.
App. 3d at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
44. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273. In Sail'er Inn, the California Supreme
Court emphasized that employment is a fundamental right, but its holding did not depend on
this determination. 5 Cal. 3d at 20, 485 P.2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
45. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
46. Id. at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
Applying the strict scrutiny standard to the case at bench, respondent does not sug-
gest and we cannot think of any compelling governmental interest for posing one set
of questions to female jurors but not to male jurors. Clearly, administrative conven-
ience cannot justify a suspect classification in the face of the strict scrutiny test. The
fact that counsel was free to ask the men the same questions as were put to the
women does not alter the fact that the judge initiated and reinforced the practice of
special treatment for female jurors.
Id. (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. Bobb also contended that her due process rights
were violated by the municipal court's denial of a continuance. Justice Miller did not find it
necessary to address that contention since the court reversed the contempt conviction on equal
protection grounds. Id.
C. Presiding Justice Kline's Opinion: Avoiding Equal Protection
Analysis
Presiding Justice Kline agreed that the lower court judgment should
be reversed, but stated that Justice Miller had "reached the right result
for the wrong reason."48 Justice Kline thought it "unnecessary to reach
the constitutional issue"'4 9 and would not have sustained the contempt
judgment "even if persuaded the [municipal] court's questioning were
constitutionally valid."5 Justice Kline believed that "the most signifi-
cant issue raised by this case relate[d] more to the proper treatment of
jurors than the rights of women."51 Consequently, he avoided equal pro-
tection analysis by focusing on the role and treatment of jurors and on
the nature of the court order challenged by Bobb.
Justice Kline cautioned that "the summary contempt power is the
ultimate judicial weapon and must therefore be employed with great pru-
dence and caution, lest it be improperly used to stifle freedom of thought
and speech." 2 Furthermore, the judicial system must respect "the di-
verse views that are today commonly and properly represented on a ve-
nire in this state."53 In Justice Kline's view, a contempt action against a
juror required a specific wrongful intent, lest a criminal penalty be im-
posed for "conscientious commitment to principle."54 Justice Kline re-
viewed the initial interchange between Bobb and the municipal court
48. Id. (Kline, J., concurring).
49. Id. Justice Kline cited three cases for the principle that a "court will not decide a
constitutional question unless such construction is absolutely necessary." Id. at 867 n.1, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 274 n.1. In People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 547 P.2d 1000, 128 Cal. Rptr.
888 (1976), and in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948), the
California Supreme Court did not decide the constitutional questions presented because statu-
tory construction achieved the results sought by the parties raising the constitutional ques-
tions. In In re Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424 (1903), a determination as to
standing disposed of the case. The Palermo majority noted that it is not "good judicial prac-
tice" to gratuitously make an opportunity to reach or declare constitutional questions. 32 Cal.
2d at 66, 195 P.2d at 9. However, three of the seven justices on the Palermo court would have
reversed on the additional ground of unconstitutionality. Id. at 66, 195 P.2d at 9 (Gibson,
C.J., Carter & Traynor, JJ., concurring). The general rule of not reviewing matters unneces-
sary to a decision has been riddled by numerous exceptions. See 6 B. WrmN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE §§ 224-25 (2d ed. 1971). There were no statutory or jurisdictional issues in Bobb,
and the court did not have to "make an opportunity" to reach the constitutional question.
50. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (Kline, J., concurring).
51. Id. Justice Kline overlooked the extent to which the rights of women intersect with
the proper treatment of jurors. Absolute exclusion of women from jury participation contin-
ued in three states until the late 1960's and exemptions were common in many states until
recently. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE
LAW 264-65 (1977).
52. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (Kline, J., concurring). Justice Kline's
reference to First Amendment rights shows that he did not avoid constitutional issues
altogether.
53. Id. at 869, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
54. Id.
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judge, a colloquy which Justice Kline estimated "could not have lasted
much longer than a minute and a half,""5 and found that "[n]owhere in
the order appealed from is there any statement regarding petitioner's in-
tent or any indication that her conduct was insolent, rude or
disrespectful." 6
After surveying reported cases, 57 Justice Kline concluded that it was
inappropriate to punish Bobb for refusing to answer particular questions
for reasons of conscience, 8 particularly when other alternatives were
available.59 Because Bobb asserted a moral principle "respectfully and in
good faith," Justice Kline concurred in the judgment setting aside the
contempt order.6°
D. Justice Rouse's Dissenting Opinion: Rejecting Equal Protection
Analysis
Justice Rouse determined that "the only issue before this court is
whether appellant had the right to refuse to answer the questions 'Do
you have a husband?' and 'What is [his] occupation?' "61 The "refusal to
answer such innocuous questions" was not "a matter of constitutional
dimension. ' 62 Justice Rouse observed that "as a trial lawyer and a trial
judge," he "asked similar questions of prospective jurors on many occa-
sions, blissfully unaware of the sinister nature of the inference now
ascribed to them by appellant." He concluded that these questions were
"a proper area of inquiry. '63
Justice Rouse found the Hamilton case "readily distinguishable"
from the Bobb facts because "the court's behavior toward Mrs. Hamilton
55. Id. at 871, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
56. Id. at 870, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276. Justice Kline dismissed the fact that Bobb was an
attorney, since "jurors serve only in their capacity as citizens." Id. at 872, 192 Cal. Rptr. at
277.
57. Justice Kline found no cases on point; the few reported cases in which prospective
jurors were held in contempt of court involved concealment or wilful misstatement of facts
during voir dire. Id. at 872 n.7, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 277 n.7. Justice Kline examined analogous
cases involving prospective jurors cited for contempt for refusal to serve and found that motive
and intent were important factors in these cases. Id. at 872-73, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78.
58. Id. at 873, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
59. Justice Kline mentioned these alternatives: (1) to put the question in issue to male as
well as female jurors, "as counsel were sure to do in any case"; (2) to excuse Bobb from service
on the case; and (3) to pass the question objected to and leave further questioning to counsel.
Id. at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79.
60. Id. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279. Justice Kline limited his decision to "the uncommon
situation in which a prospective juror, acting upon moral principle, is conscientiously and in
good faith unwilling to fully participate in voir dire for an articulate reason rationally related
to the asserted principle and does so in a respectful manner." Justice Kline stated that his rule
would not "deprive the courts of any power essential to [their] function." Id.
61. Id. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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was personally demeaning with racial overtones," whereas in Bobb's case
"there was nothing demeaning to appellant, either in the questions them-
selves or in the manner in which they were asked.",,
Furthermore, Justice Rouse found Bobb's refusal to answer "a cour-
teous, but nonetheless defiant"6 criticism of the trial judge's way of con-
ducting his court, a criticism inappropriate at that time and in that place.
As an attorney, Bobb was an officer of the court and her act of defiance
was a challenge to the presiding officer's authority. 6 Although he found
the sanction "somewhat severe," Justice Rouse felt that this matter
should be left to the trial court's discretion.67
Finding all the requisite elements of contempt present in Bobb,68
and seeing no reasonable alternative for handling Bobb's behavior, Jus-
tice Rouse voted to affirm the contempt judgment.69
II. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution
Bobb sought to overturn her contempt conviction on equal protec-
tion grounds, but her arguments did not persuade all three justices. The
three opinions illustrate that a court may embrace equal protection anal-
ysis, avoid it, or reject it. The history of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the language of the Equal Protection Clause shed some light on the vary-
ing responses and explain why equal protection has been "a fertile source
of Supreme Court business. ' 70
64. Id. at 876, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280. Justice Rouse's conclusion suggests that a judge's
values have a significant impact on equal protection analysis. Contrast his assertion that there
was nothing demeaning in the questions asked of Carolyn Bobb with Bobb's own statement
that she objecied to the inference that women are influenced by their spouses' opinions, while
men are not so influenced, an inference that "hurt [her] gut." Id. at 871, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276-
77. Katherine Stoner, the ACLU cooperating attorney who argued the case before the court of
appeal, said "The attack was on her dignity as a person .... The underlying assumption is
that women have no independent legal status and don't have the ability to think for them-
selves. It harks back to the idea that a woman loses her identity when she marries." Rasmus-
sen, Jailed Woman Juror Cleared of Contempt, ACLU News, Aug.-Sept. 1983, at 5. See also
Howell, Inadmissible Evidence, Ms. MAGAZINE, Feb. 1984, at 19 ("Bobb's case could be called
one of the relics of male domination").
65. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
66. Id. In contrast, Justice Kline believed that Bobb's status as an attorney was irrele-
vant. See supra note 56.
67. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 876-77, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81. Justice Rouse derived the elements of con-
tempt from a lower federal court case, United States v. Cantillon, 309 F. Supp. 700, 703 (C.D.
Cal. 1970). These elements were: (I) disruption of the court's judicial business; (2) deliberate
refusal to answer by one aware of the duty to answer; and (3) an order by the court that the
individual answer.
69. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
70. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: 4 Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12 (1972).
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In 1868, Congress added the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Amendment contained three significant clauses
in section one that limited governmental power: the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause; the Due Process Clause; and the Equal Protection Clause.
Of the three, only the Equal Protection Clause "added new language to
the Constitution," and "[i]t alone is found in virtually all the forms of the
proposed amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress. . . . [I]t was the
common meeting ground of those who carried the Amendment through
the Thirty-ninth Congress."71 The Fourteenth Amendment provides
simply that "No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."72
A. Development of the Two-Tiered Approach
L Early Limitations and the Rational Basis Standard
In 1873, the Slaughter-House Cases73 gave the Supreme Court its
first significant opportunity to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court relied on historical grounds to reject plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion arguments against the creation of an exclusive monopoly to operate
stockyards in New Orleans:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of [the
Equal Protection Clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race
and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other.74
This restrictive reading of the Equal Protection Clause severely lim-
ited its scope. Indeed, years after the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice
Holmes described the Equal Protection Clause as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments. '75
In the decades following the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme
Court developed a standard of review that reflected its restrictive view of
71. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 341-
42 (1949).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 35 for the complete text of the
amendment.
73. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (butchers in New Orleans sought relief from a Louisiana
statute that created a 25 year monopoly for one slaughterhouse, conferring privileges on a few
while depriving many of the right to exercise their trade).
74. Id. at 81.
75. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, 3).
It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of
this sort [unequal effect on different groups]. But the answer is that the law does all
that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within
the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as
its means allow.
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the Equal Protection Clause. The Court determined that "the 14th
Amendment does not prevent the states from resorting to classification
for the purposes of legislation"76 and that equal protection demands only
reasonableness in legislative and administrative classifications.77 This ap-
proach is often described as the rational basis standard of review. In an
early case, the Court formulated the standard as follows:
1. The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion ....
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathema-
tical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed.78
Since this interpretation of "reasonableness" was quite permissive, "the
original test afforded virtually no scope for review" of governmental
classifications.79
Later, the Supreme Court explained that "the classification . . .
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike."8 This more demanding formulation
of the test permitted some scope for review, but in practice courts contin-
ued to defer to legislative determinations and required only minimal ra-
tionality in the nature of the classification, as "tested by the
classification's ability to serve the purposes intended by the legislative or
administrative rule."8"
The rational basis standard comprises the first tier of the two-tier
test of equal protection which ultimately developed. 2
2. The Strict Scrutiny Test
In 1949, scholars declared that "after eighty years of relative desue-
76. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (held unconstitutional a
Virginia statute that taxed domestic corporations doing business within and without the state
on the basis of income from all sources, while domestic corporations doing business solely
outside the state were completely exempt from taxation).
77. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrUnONAL LAW 994 (1978).
78. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (New York statute
regulating pumping of mineral waters held not to violate equal protection guarantee).
79. L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 995.
80. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
81. L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 995.
82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Recent Supreme Court cases indicate that
a "middle" tier of Equal Protection Clause review has developed. See infra notes 103-08 and
accompanying text.
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tude, the equal protection clause is now coming into its own." 3 Never-
theless, most courts continued to apply the permissive rational basis
standard and to reject equal protection claims except in the context of
racial discrimination.84 In the 1960's, however, a "new equal protection"
standard evolved. 5 Under this new analysis, governmental classifica-
tions that involve suspect classes86 or that abridge fundamental rights 7
are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 8 In these cases, the state bears the
heavy burden of showing that the classification is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest.8 9 This analysis is often described as
the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Early cases limited suspect classes to racial classifications, in accord-
ance with the early view that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
remedy wrongs inflicted upon blacks.90 However, by the late 1960's the
Court had recognized new suspect classifications, such as alienage. 91 In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,92 the Court listed
the indicia of a suspect class: whether the class is saddled with disabili-
ties, relegated to "political powerlessness," or subjected to "a history of
purposeful unequal treatment.
93
While the rational basis test has proved to be so permissive that clas-
sifications are seldom held to violate equal protection under that stan-
dard, strict scrutiny review has proved to be so strict that classifications
seldom satisfy it.94 "[T]he aggressive 'new' equal protection . . . was
'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." 95
83. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 71, at 341.
84. Gunther, supra note 70, at 8.
85. Id. See also J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 112-13 (1983).
86. A suspect class is a class which is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
87. The Court describes a fundamental right as a right "among the rights and liberties
protected by the Constitution" and as one "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 29, 33-34.
88. Gunther, supra note 70, at 8.
89. See Forrester, Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 645, 646 (1975).
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1012.
91. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny").
92. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
93. Id. at 28.
94. "[T]here are very few cases which strictly scrutinize and yet uphold instances of im-
paired fundamental rights." L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1000. See supra notes 86-87 for delini-
tions of suspect class and fundamental right.
95. Gunther, supra note 70, at 8.
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The strict scrutiny standard comprises the second tier of the two-tier
test of equal protection.
B. Equal Protection and Gender-Based Discrimination
Gender-based discrimination has posed a special problem for the
Supreme Court. On the one hand, women appear to meet the criteria
described in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, since,
as a class, women have been subjected to "a history of purposeful une-
qual treatment," have been relegated to "a position of political
powerlessness," and are "saddled with . . . disabilities."96 However, a
majority of the Supreme Court has never recognized gender as a suspect
classification and does not require strict scrutiny of gender-based
differentiations.
L Early Protectionism
The Court's reluctance to recognize gender as a suspect classifica-
tion may be rooted in the early protectionist attitude courts and legisla-
tures held toward women.97 In an early Supreme Court case sustaining
an Illinois law that denied women the right to practice law, a concurring
opinion illustrated the philosophy underlying protectionist laws:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. ... [The] paramount destiny and mis-
sion of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.9"
This paternalistic view resulted in laws that limited women's work-
ing hours,99 restrained women from engaging in occupations like bar-
tending,"°° and excluded women from jury duty unless they elected to
register. 101 These laws were largely immune from attack under the Equal
Protection Clause because courts applied the permissive rational basis
96. 411 U.S. at 28.
97. For a historical survey of protectionism in the United States, see Comment, Equal
Protection of the Sexes in Kentucky: The Effect of the Hummeldorf Decision on a Woman's
Right to Choose Her Surname, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 475,478-81 (1982); see also Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (1971) (en banc) ("The
pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often... been... a cage.").
98. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
99. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
100. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute allowed a woman to work as a bar-
tender only if she was the wife or daughter of the male owner).
101. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). See also supra note 51.
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standard. 102
2. Toward a Middle-Tier of Analysis
In the past decade, the Court's deference to gender-based classifica-
tion has waned. However, rather than recognize gender as a suspect
classification, the Court has developed a middle-tier of equal protection
review. While the standard is "clearly more intensive than the defer-
ence" of the rational basis test, it is still "less demanding than the strict-
ness" of the strict scrutiny test.10 3 The new standard is
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny, "important" objec-
tives are enough here; and where means must be "necessary" under
the new equal protection, and merely rationally related under the
old equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to sur-
vive the intermediate level of review.' 4
The evolution of this middle-tier standard has allowed the Court to exer-
cise flexibility in gender discrimination cases. For example, the Court
has continued to apply a rational basis type of analysis when it wishes to
uphold ameliorative gender-based classifications that compensate for past
discrimination against women.10 In effect, the Court is able to apply
"strict scrutiny for purely discriminatory classifications and permissive
review for ameliorative classifications." 106 Some scholars, and some
102. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standardfor Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 163, 163-64.
103. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 294 (3d ed. 1981). This middle-tier scrutiny occurs when the Court finds "bite"
in the Equal Protection Clause "after explicitly voicing the traditionally toothless minimal
scrutiny standard." Gunther, supra note 70, at 18-19. See also Choper, Forum: Equal Protec-
tion and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 658-59 (1975) (describing a "newer
equal protection" consisting of a "minimal rationality- with-bite approach" and characterized
by the application of "greater scrutiny than [the Court] asserted"); J. BAER, supra note 85, at
118-26.
104. G. GUNTHER, supra note 103, at 294. The new standard has been applied primarily
in gender discrimination cases, but similar intermediate standards have been applied to classifi-
cations based on illegitimacy and alienage. Id.
105. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) ("Reduction of the disparity in
economic condition between men.and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women has been recognized as. . .an important governmental objective").
106. Note, supra note 102, at 186-87. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971)
(statutory preference for men as administrators of estates is unconstitutional gender discrimi-
nation); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (requirement that female service
personnel prove spouses are dependents is unconstitutional gender discrimination); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-45 (1975) (Social Security provision favoring women
as dependents but not as wage earners is unconstitutional gender discrimination); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (statute requiring child support of female children to age 18
and male children to age 21 is unconstitutional gender discrimination); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (different legal drinking ages for females and males is unconstitu-
tional gender discrimination); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-09 (1977) (Social Secur-
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Supreme Court Justices, theorize that the Court is working toward a uni-
versal intermediate standard to replace the two-tier test entirely."°7 Un-
certainty prevails. 10
8
IH. Equal Protection Under the California Constitution
A. Strict Scrutiny of Gender-Based Classifications
Although the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitu-
tion has been interpreted as substantially equivalent to that of the United
States Constitution, the doctrine of independent state grounds 0 9 permits
California "to determine, without federal review, whether its constitution
provides suspect classifications or fundamental interests beyond those
found at the federal level, since such a determination expands upon
ity death benefits paid to women regardless of dependency but to men only if dependent is
unconstitutional gender discrimination); and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 723-33 (1982) (exclusion of men from nursing school is unconstitutional gender discrimi-
nation) with Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (state tax law favoring widows is
constitutional); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505-10 (1975) (federal law providing ser-
vicewomen with longer period to earn promotions is constitutional); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 316-20 (1977) (per curiam) (statute favoring women in computation of Social Secur-
ity old-age benefits is constitutional); and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-73
(1981) (statute making only men liable for statutory rape is constitutional).
107. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); J. BAER, supra note 85, at 281;
G. GUNTHER, supra note 103, at 293-95.
108. Justice O'Connor's presence on the Supreme Court is an element in the uncertainty.
In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion (Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The
Court held that a state statute that excluded males from a state-supported professional nursing
school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O'Connor
applied the middle-tier analysis. Id. at 724. She appeared to oppose ameliorative gender-based
classifications:
[The test] must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objec-
tive reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to
exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from
an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.
Id. at 724-25. However, she qualified this position by saying that "[i]n limited circumstances,
a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly
assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened." Id. at 728. In Hogan, there
was no showing that women were disproportionately burdened, and, therefore, the law was
unconstitutional. Id. at 729.
109. The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds is based on "the principle
that federalism, embodied in the ninth and tenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, dictates that the states are the ultimate expositors of state law as long as their interpreta-
tions do not conflict with, or infringe upon federally guaranteed rights." Comment, supra note
42, at 1157. "Expansive state treatment is most likely to occur in areas left open by the United
States Supreme Court. Terms such as 'suspect classification'. . illustrate vague Court guide-
lines that are highly susceptible to expansive interpretation by the states." Id. at 1162.
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rather than discriminates against federal guarantees."' 110
California courts have relied upon the doctrine of independent state
grounds in deciding gender-based discrimination cases since the
landmark decision of Sail'er Inn in 1971. In that case the court held that
"classifications based upon sex should be treated as suspect." '111 The
court compared classifications based on sex to classifications designated
by the Supreme Court as suspect and concluded that gender should be a
suspect class: sex, "like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status
into which the class members are locked by the accident of birth."1" 2 Sex
"frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to soci-
ety," and "the whole class is relegated to an inferior legal status without
regard to the capabilities or characteristics of its individual members." '13
The court also found that all suspect classifications, including sex, carry
with them an underlying "stigma of inferiority and second class citizen-
ship."114 Thus, under California law, gender-based classifications receive
closer scrutiny than they receive under the United States Constitution.
Suspect classifications are "presumptively invidious,"115 and the state has
the burden of demonstrating that its classifications have been precisely
tailored to serve compelling governmental interests.1 16
Despite this demanding standard, gender-based discrimination
claims do not prevail automatically. Claimants must first meet the pre-
liminary requirements for equal protection actions in general. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that the "prerequisite to a meritorious
claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups
110. Id. at 1169. The Supreme Court recently atffrmed the validity of the independent
state grounds doctrine: "Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of
rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases
where there is an adequate and independent state ground." Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469,
3475 (1983). However, Justice O'Connor announced a new rule in Long:
[When the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law
required it to do so.
Id. at 3476.
111. 5 Cal. 3d at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339. See also supra notes 41-42.
112. 5 Cal. 3d at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 19,485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. The court cited examples of the severe
legal and social disabilities imposed on women, blacks, aliens, and the poor: denial of the right
to vote; ineligibility to serve as jurors; exclusion from employment and educational opportuni-
ties; and disadvantages in laws relating to property, contracts, and business ownership. Id. at
19, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
115. Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 886, 679 P.2d 458, 467, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807, 816
(1984) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
116. Id.
in an unequal manner."' 17 This prerequisite showing contains three sep-
arate and equally important components: (1) state action; (2) similarly
situated persons or groups; and (3) discrimination (classification has an
unequal effect). Every equal protection claim is subject to a threshold
analysis of these components.
The state action component is satisfied when the equal protection
claimant demonstrates the presence of legislation, adjudication, executive
act, or administrative conduct."' Nonlegislative action is more likely to
discriminate subtly because "no official use" is made of a suspect classifi-
cation. When this occurs, the record may leave a suspect classification as
the only plausible explanation for governmental conduct." 9
The second component, that similarly situated persons or groups are
affected by the classification, requires an analysis of where the persons or
groups stand with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law. 120 In this
component, courts must determine whether different people share com-
mon characteristics in relation to a legislative or administrative goal.
The final component, discrimination, requires an analysis of how the
state's classification affects similarly situated people. While case law does
not reveal a formula, California courts have not required the unequal
effect of a suspect classification to reach any particular level of disadvan-
tage.' 21 In fact, strict scrutiny is required "irrespective of the nature of
the interest implicated because [suspect] classifications in and of them-
selves are an affront to the dignity and self-respect of the members of the
class set apart for disparate treatment.' ' 22
Thus, the California Supreme Court's landmark holding in Sail'er
Inn did not remove all obstacles to gender discrimination claims. Claim-
117. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530, 601 P.2d 549, 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1980)
(emphasis original).
118. L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1025.
119. Id.
120. 25 Cal. 3d at 530-31, 601 P.2d at 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The "similarly situated"
component has been analyzed most often in criminal cases, e.g., People v. Macias, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 465, 473, 187 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1982) (persons convicted of different crimes are not
similarly situated for equal protection purposes). For an interesting noncriminal case, see
Johnson v. California St. Dep't of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878, 177 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1981). The Johnson court held that parents of children in day nurseries are not "similarly
situated" to parents of children in public schools for purposes of state regulations proscribing
corporal punishment of children in private nurseries while permitting corporal punishment in
public schools with parental consent. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 884-85, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53.
121. One member of the United States Supreme Court has argued that an equal protection
claim should receive strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny only if the claim is "serious."
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 742 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
However, the majority of the Court rejected that requirement: "[T]he analysis and level of
scrutiny applied to determine the validity of the classification do not vary simply because the
objective appears acceptable to individual Members of the Court." Id. at 724 n.9 (O'Connor,
J.).
122. Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 16, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248 (1979).
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ants must first demonstrate state action affecting similarly situated per-
sons in an unequal manner. Only then may courts apply strict scrutiny
to a gender-based classification.
B. Application of Strict Scrutiny Since Sail'er Inn
Sail'er Inn effected "significant statutory readjustments," but "judi-
cial repercussions have been limited to a handful of cases." '123 Since
1971, at least ten claims of equal protection in the context of gender-
based discrimination have reached the California appellate courts. 124 In
most of these cases, threshold requirements were not at issue on appeal,
and courts were able to use the strict scrutiny standard to invalidate dis-
criminatory statutes and practices, 125 just as Justice Miller did in Bobb.
For example, in Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,1 26 the
California Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a workers'
compensation law that applied a conclusive presumption of total depen-
dency to widows but not to widowers of deceased employees. The court
examined the threshold issue of whether men and women were similarly
situated with regard to the purpose of the statute.1 27 The state agency
argued that men and women were not similarly situated because of past
economic discrimination against women and that the statute's purpose
was to compensate women for the continuing consequences of this dis-
crimination. 128 The court, however, determined that the provision was
based on an "outmoded" presumption 29 that wives are dependent on
their husbands. It declared this presumption "the relic of an era in
which the majority of persons-certainly the majority of those in posi-
123. Comment, supra note 42, at 1182.
124. See, e.g., Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849,
138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (en bane); Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 130 Cal. App. 3d 298, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1982); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979); Cotton v.
Municipal Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 601, 130 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1976); Boren v. California Dep't of
Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1976); Eckl v. Davis, 51 Cal.
App. 3d 831, 124 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975); Hardy v. Stumpf, 37 Cal. App. 3d 958, 112 Cal. Rptr.
739 (1974); Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1973); and People v.
Olague, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973) (disapproved in Cotton v. Munici-
pal Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 601, 607, 130 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1976)); see also People v. Supe-
rior Court (Hartway), 19 Cal. 3d 338, 347-54, 562 P.2d 1315, 1319-23, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66, 70-
74 (1977) (en banc) (women prostitutes made a claim of gender-based discrimination in the
special context of discriminatory law enforcement but failed to prove that they were deliber-
ately singled out for prosecution and that the prosecution would not have been pursued but for
a discriminatory design); People v. Municipal Court (Street), 89 Cal. App. 3d 739, 750-51, 153
Cal. Rptr. 69, 75-76 (1979) (women prostitutes made a prima facie showing of discriminatory
prosecution and were entitled to a discovery order giving them access to prosecution statistics).
125. See infra notes 126, 136-42 and accompanying text.
126. 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (en banc).
127. Id. at 403, 563 P.2d at 853, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
128. Id. at 403-04, 563 P.2d at 853, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
129. Id. at 405-06, 563 P.2d at 854, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
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tions of power-accepted as axiomatic that 'the God of nature made wo-
man frail, lovely and dependent . , ,3
Finding men and women similarly situated with respect to the legiti-
mate purpose of the law, the court applied strict scrutiny to the classifica-
tion. 131 It found no compelling governmental interest in treating widows
and widowers differently, because there was no evidence that the legisla-
ture intended ameliorative economic redress. 132 In addition, even if the
alleged ameliorative purpose were not merely speculative, the classifica-
tion was not the least restrictive means of achieving this legislative objec-
tive.133 The statute's broad presumption of dependency benefited some
financially independent widows and denied equal protection of the laws
to widowers and employed women: an employed woman could not pro-
vide financial security to her widower in the event of a fatal industrial
accident, while an employed man could provide such security to his
widow. 134 The gender-based classification thus failed the strict scrutiny
test.
California courts of appeal have used strict scrutiny to invalidate a
variety of statutes and governmental practices that differentiated on the
basis of gender.131 In some cases, as in Arp, the decisive factor in the
analysis was the lack of a compelling state interest. 136 In other cases, a
compelling state interest was present, but the state failed to establish that
the classification was necessary to further the state interest.137 For exam-
130. Id. at 404, 563 P.2d at 854, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (quoting J. BROWNE, DEBATES IN
THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA 259 (1850)).
131. The Arp court first examined federal precedents. It found ten major gender discrimi-
nation cases decided by the United States Supreme Court since 1971. Six cases invalidated
gender-based classifications, while four cases upheld them. 19 Cal. 3d at 400, 563 P.2d at 851,
138 Cal. Rptr. at 295. The Arp court, observing that the Supreme Court's standard of review
was unclear, reaffirmed California's use of the strict scrutiny standard in gender discrimination
cases. Id.
132. Id. at 404-06, 563 P.2d at 853-55, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
133. Id. at 406-07, 563 P.2d at 855, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
134. Id. at 406, 563 P.2d at 855, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
135. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
136. See, eg., Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 130 Cal. App. 3d 298, 181 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1982)
(Rouse, J.); Boren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 683 (1976). In Hiatt, classifications in the city's affirmative action plan were based solely
on race and sex; the classifications were unconstitutional because the mere existence of racial
imbalance or of a disproportionate representation of the sexes does not give rise to a compel-
ling state interest. 130 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 667. In Boren, a state unemploy-
ment insurance provision disqualified any person who left his or her job because of marital or
domestic duties, if that person did not supply the family's major support. 59 Cal. App. 3d at
253, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 684. In a representative year, 99% of the claimants declared ineligible
under the provision were women. Id. at 255, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686. The state demonstrated
"some legitimate policy choices but no compelling governmental interest." Id at 260, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 689.
137. See, eg., Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 17-18, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249-50 (1979)
(state has a compelling interest in protecting female jail inmates from sexual assault while they
Winter 1985]
336 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 12:315
ple, in Hardy v. Stumpf,138 height and weight requirements for police
officers were held unconstitutional. While the police department had a
compelling interest in hiring persons who could perform the duties of a
police officer, the court of appeal found no relationship between job per-
formance and the height and weight requirements. 139 Thus, the depart-
ment failed to carry its burden under the strict scrutiny test because it
did not prove that the requirements were necessary to further its compel-
ling state interest. Similarly, in Cotton v. Municipal Court,'I the court of
appeal considered a statute that made fathers primarily responsible for
the support of their minor children. The court found a compelling state
interest in securing support for minor children and in protecting the pub-
lic from the burden of supporting children whose parents could afford to
provide for them."' However, differentiating between mothers and fa-
thers was not necessary to further the compelling state interest. 42
The strict scrutiny standard of Sail'er Inn did not prove to be "fatal
in fact" in two unusual cases. In Eckl v. Davis,14 3 the court of appeal
considered a city ordinance that proscribed nudity on public beaches.
One part of the ordinance permitted men, but not women, to sunbathe
and swim with their breasts uncovered.'" Plaintiffs challenged this por-
tion of the ordinance on equal protection grounds.' 45
In an analysis notable only for its brevity, 46 the Eckl court did not
discuss any threshold issues. In this early interpretation of Sail'er Inn,47
the court declared that strict scrutiny was not required since the gender-
based classification in question did not relate to a fundamental right.'48
As Justice Miller noted in Bobb, it is now clear that strict scrutiny must
be applied to any classification involving either a fundamental interest or
a suspect class. 14 9 Because of its erroneous interpretation of Sail'er Inn,
are incarcerated, but depriving women of a minimum security facility is not the only effective
way to insure their safety).
138. 37 Cal. App. 3d 958, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1974).
139. Id. at 962-64, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 742-44.
140. 59 Cal. App. 3d 601, 130 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1976).
141. Id. at 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
142. Id. at 606-07, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
143. 51 Cal. App. 3d 831, 124 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975).
144. Id. at 835, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
145. Id. at 847, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
146. The Eckl opinion is 17 pages long in the official reporter. The discussion of the equal
protection claim occupies less than one page.
147. Eckl was decided in 1975, four years after Sail'er Inn. The only relevant appellate
decision in that four year period was Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1973), which neither mentioned Sail'er Inn nor provided a correct model for equal protection
analysis. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
148. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
149. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. See also Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 885, 679 P.2d 458, 467, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807,
816 (1984).
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the Eckl court applied the rational basis test to the ordinance. The court
found that the classification was reasonable. 150
The ordinance declared that nudity would unreasonably interfere
with the right of all persons to use and enjoy the city's public beaches
and parks by causing many people to leave or to stay away from these
facilities.' 1 Since "nudity in the case of women is commonly understood
to include the uncovering of the breasts," it was necessary for the ordi-
nance to differentiate between men and women in defining nudity.'52 A
proper application of strict scrutiny might not have changed the outcome
in Eckl, since the court could have reasoned, at the threshold level, that
men and women were not similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purpose of the law, because "[n]ature, not the legislative body, created
the distinction between that portion of a woman's body and that of a
man's torso."'
153
In Allyn v. Allison,' S4 the other unusual California case decided
since Sail'er Inn, the court of appeal considered a voter registration stat-
ute that required women but not men to designate their marital status.' 55
Women plaintiffs in Allyn raised an equal protection argument against
this requirement.' 5
6
Although the court did not analyze threshold issues, it considered-
virtually as an afterthought -the disadvantage component.' 5 7 Citing the
United States Supreme Court, the Allyn court stated that "'the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than invidious discrimination.' ,158
Designation of marital status, the court continued, did not disadvantage
women "in any way" because there was "nothing private about the status
of marriage or its termination" and because the requirement was not
"onerous or burdensome."' 59 Therefore, the court found no invidious
discrimination. This conclusion ignored the fact that men enjoyed pri-
vacy as to their marital status when registering to vote. More impor-
150. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 696 ("The classification. . . rests upon a
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced are treated alike.").
151. Id. at 836 n.1, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 687 n.l.
152. Id. at 848, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
153. Id.
154. 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1973).
155. Id. at 450, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
156. Id. at 451, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79. Plaintiffs also raised issues relating to the right to
vote guaranteed by the California Constitution and the Nineteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id.
157. Id. at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
158. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). In Lee Opti-
cal, opticians asserted an equal protection claim against a regulatory scheme that exempted
sellers of ready-to-wear glasses. 348 U.S. at 488. In this commercial context, the Court found
no "invidious discrimination." Id. at 489.
159. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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tantly, the justices failed to consider whether the gender-based
requirement disadvantaged women by diminishing their dignity and self-
respect. Plaintiffs had asserted that they were "affronted and offended by
having to choose between MISS and MRS. and thereby designate their
marital status.""6 If the justices had been sensitive to the implications of
the requirement, they could have recognized the presence of
disadvantage.
The court also decided that men and women were not similarly situ-
ated because "use of multi-names and titles" was unique to women. 6'
Knowledge of the marital status of a woman was "an aid in assuring that
a previous registration [had] been cancelled and that a woman does not
vote twice," whereas knowledge of a man's marital status would provide
no such aid.162 These conclusions are based on the assumption that every
woman adopts her husband's surname upon marriage and on the impli-
cation that many women take advantage of name changes to vote twice.
A more incisive analysis would have found that men and women were
similarly situated in relation to the legitimate purpose of the law.
The main thrust of the Allyn decision, however, was its application
of the rational basis test. Although Sail'er Inn had been decided two
years earlier, the court relied on California case law predating Sail'er Inn
in evaluating the reasonableness of the voter registration requirement.163
Plaintiffs agreed that prevention of voter fraud was a reasonable govern-
mental objective, but they argued that requiring the use of the designa-
tion Miss or Mrs. was not necessary to accomplish the state's objective
and was therefore unreasonable.' Under the permissive rational basis
test, the burden was on the plaintiffs to show that the requirement had no
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute. Proper application
of the strict scrutiny test would have made a crucial difference at this
stage of the analysis. Correct strict scrutiny analysis would have placed
the burden on the state to show that the requirement was precisely tai-
lored and necessary to the compelling governmental interest of prevent-
ing voter fraud. Plaintiffs pointed out that other questions on the
registration affidavit, particularly a question asking each elector to report
whether he or she had previously registered under another name, pro-
vided the essential information. 6 ' Thus, the outcome of Allyn should
have been similar to other cases in which a compelling state interest was
present but the state failed to establish that the classification was neces-
sary to further the interest. The strict scrutiny requirement of Sail'er Inn
160. Id. at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Fleming, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 452-53, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
162. Id. at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
163. Id. at 451-53, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
164. Id. at 451, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
165. Id. at 451-52, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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failed in this case because the Allyn court did not apply it.166
C. Application of Strict Scrutiny in Bobb v. Municipal Court
L Justice Miller's Opinion
Justice Miller's opinion embraced the model of equal protection
analysis originally developed by the United States Supreme Court and
strengthened by the California Supreme Court. Justice Miller correctly
recognized that in California a proper equal protection claim alleging
gender-based discrimination demands strict scrutiny review. The plain-
tiff must, of course, first meet the preliminary requirement for equal pro-
tection claims: state action that affects similarly situated persons
unequally. 16
7
Justice Miller did not analyze all of the threshold issues since they
were not at issue on appeal.1 68 The facts show that state action was pres-
ent in the form of judicial action. 69 The opinion does not reveal any
argument that women and men were not similarly situated as potential
jurors, and the municipal court judge admitted that he had differentiated
between women and men during voir dire.170 Justice Miller found that
Bobb was disadvantaged by the stigma implied in the pattern of question-
ing.17 1 Since the order to answer the questions reinforced a stigma of
inferiority and second-class citizenship,172 it gave rise to a presumption
of invidious discrimination. 173
Thus, Justice Miller applied strict scrutiny and placed the burden on
the state to show that a compelling governmental interest required the
gender classification.174 Since the state did not proffer any reason for the
disparate questioning, much less a compelling governmental interest, the
classification violated California's equal protection guarantees. 175
Justice Miller's ability to discern the parallel between Bobb's posi-
tion as a prospective woman juror and Hamilton's position as a black
166. The California Supreme Court dnied a hearing, although three justices dissented
from that denial. Id. at 455, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The court of appeal noted that legislation
was pending that would effect the change sought by plaintiffs. Id. at 453 n.4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
80 n.4. See infra note 197. The supreme court may have denied hearing because of this
legislation.
167. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
169. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (state judicial
action is as clearly "state action" as state administrative action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 20 (1948) ("state action" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment refers to exertions
of state power in all forms). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
170. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
171. Id. at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 115, 121 and accompanying text.
174. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866-67, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
175. Id. at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
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witness demonstrated sensitivity to subtle issues of dignity and equality.
This sensitivity is critical at the preliminary stage of equal protection
analysis when plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been disadvan-
taged by classifications based on suspect criteria. When this sensitivity is
missing, the protection accorded Californians by the strict scrutiny hold-
ing of Sail'er Inn is unavailing.
2. Justice Kline's Opinion
Justice Kline's opinion avoided equal protection analysis entirely,
despite the fact that Bobb sought to overturn her contempt conviction on
equal protection grounds.176 He believed that jurors' rights were more
important than women's rights in this case.177 He thus avoided Sail'er
Inn's strict scrutiny review by relying on the general legal principle that
courts should not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily. 17
8
While superficially Justice Kline's decision favored Bobb, his analy-
sis accorded limited protection to prospective jurors. He suggested that a
juror's remedy for discriminatory questioning is to refuse to answer on
the grounds of conscience. His holding leaves lower courts free to con-
tinue discriminatory questioning; those jurors who refuse to answer can
be excused from service. 179 The net result of this procedure could be to
reduce the number of women available for jury service. 180
Justice Kline's avoidance of equal protection analysis reveals insen-
sitivity to the stigma implied in the municipal court's questioning. The
justice acknowledged "the widely shared belief that women should be
treated no differently than men,"'' and he cited a study of adverse juror
reaction to sexually discriminatory questions asked of women on voir
dire.'82 Nevertheless, he avoided equal protection analysis, which offered
complete redress for gender-based discrimination. He chose to make a
statement about jurors' rights in a decision that would oblige each poten-
tial woman juror to fight a separate battle of conscience. His approach
places a needlessly heavy burden on each victim of discrimination and
does not address the larger context in which the discrimination occurs.
By avoiding equal protection analysis, Justice Kline refused to extend to
prospective jurors the important safeguards established by Sail'er Inn.
176. See supra note 47.
177. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (Kline, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 867-68, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
179. Id. at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
180. Practices that tend to exclude women from juries deprive litigants of a verdict deliv-
ered by a fair cross-section of the community, discriminate against men with regard to fre-
quency of jury service, and may have a differential impact on the treatment of male and female
litigants. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz & A. PRicE, supra note 51, at 262.
181. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
182. Id. at 874 n.l1, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.l1.
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3. Justice Rouse's Opinion
Justice Rouse rejected equal protection analysis. The legal grounds
for this rejection are not entirely clear. In general, Justice Rouse focused
on threshold issues rather than on application of the strict scrutiny test.
He seemed to focus on the discrimination component. He was unable to
discern a parallel between the situation of Mary Hamilton and that of
Carolyn Bobb.1s3 He read the record as a "not unfriendly exchange" in
which the municipal court judge "[m]ore than once" gave Bobb a chance
to respond.' 4 Using a personal yardstick, Justice Rouse found that the
disparate questioning did not attain "constitutional dimension"185 or
"constitutional magnitude."'8 6 Since a gender-based classification is pre-
sumptively invidious if any disadvantage is shown, l8 7 Justice Rouse ap-
plied an inappropriate and ill-defined requirement of "magnitude."
Justice Rouse's rejection of equal protection analysis demonstrates
insensitivity to the stigma implied in the municipal court judge's ques-
tioning. While he found that the questions were not personally demean-
ing in content or manner,18 8 Justice Rouse failed to consider context. He
was unable to see that the questions were demeaning when directed only
to women, thereby attributing to women inferior status and dependence
on their husbands. The questions themselves were innocuous, just as the
name "Mary" is innocuous apart from any context. In Hamilton, the
stigma implied in the use of the name "Mary" derived from the deliber-
ate disparate use of titles in a courtroom setting.18 9 Thus, Justice
Rouse's opinion, like that ofAllyn, 190 focused inappropriately on the dis-
crimination component of analysis and rejected strict scrutiny review.
IV. Bobb in Context
A. Triviality or Symbolism?
Much has been written about the nature and the process of judicial
review. "Judicial authority to select the most apt of several possible ave-
nues of decision is a sensitive and a powerful weapon. . . . It is a
weapon which strengthens the wielder, but which tests him as well."' 91
Part of the test stems from the fact that truth is composed of nuances
183. Id. at 876, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting). See supra notes 27-32, 45, 64
and accompanying text.
184. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
186. Id. at 877, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
187. See supra notes 115, 121-22.
188. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
189. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
191. Pollak, The Supreme Court and the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49
CALIF. L. Rav. 15, 17 (1961).
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that are not equally visible to everyone. 192 In the search for truth, each
judge brings to bear all of his or her knowledge, experience, and princi-
ples, but, as Judge Cardozo observed, there are more subtle forces, far
beneath the surface, by which "judges are kept consistent with them-
selves, and inconsistent with each other." 193 These subtle forces include
"the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the com-
plex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make
the man." 194 In cases of gender-based discrimination, our predominately
male judiciary must sometimes make a special effort to overcome subcon-
scious pressures of prejudice, to hear and see with sensitivity, and, above
all, to avoid discounting as trivial issues of great importance to individu-
als seeking redress.
In his concurring opinion in Allyn v. Allison, Presiding Justice Roth
described the requirement that only women designate their marital status
on their voting registration as "a discrimination so trivial" that it did not
"engender sufficient provocation to attempt to correct [it] through the
judicial process."' 195 He asserted that "the difference complained of is
[sic], and over a long period of years has had, so little effect upon the
allegedly wronged party" that the discrimination would have to be
"whipped and beaten" to reach constitutional proportion. 196 Justice
Fleming's concurrence in Allyn began: "Like titles of military rank the
market in titles for women never ceases to fluctuate. The earlier
respected title of MISTRESS has fallen on hard times, and the once
vaunted title of MADAM has suffered a worse fate, rehabilitative efforts
of Frances Perkins and Pearl Mesta notwithstanding."' 97 The opinion
continued at some length in that vein.
In Bobb, Justice Rouse's characterization of the trial judge's ques-
tions as "innocuous" and his inability to see Bobb's refusal to answer as a
"matter of constitutional dimension"1 98 echo the comments in Allyn.
One commentator has argued that the issues in Allyn were not so trivial:
"Precisely because the justices [in Allyn] thought they were dealing with
a constitutional trifle, they failed to address themselves to the principal
issue in the case."' 99
192. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 238 (1962).
193. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11-12 (1921).
194. Id. at 167.
195. Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Roth, J., concurring).
But cf supra note 121 and accompanying text.
196. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 453-54, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
197. Id. at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Fleming, J., concurring). In the opinion of the court,
Justice Compton adopted a less whimsical style, but dismissed the problem by noting that the
legislature was considering amending the law. Id. at 453 n.4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.4.
198. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
199. Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial"- A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women's
Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 546 (1974).
The plaintiffs in both Allyn and Bobb were concerned with dignity
and self-respect, not trifles. Bobb, like the plaintiffs in Allyn, sought "to
be treated as one who is free to make independent choices,"'2"° not as one
who is dependent or inferior. "[T]he most destructive dependency of all
is psychological, the dependency that limits a woman's sense of who she
is and what she can do."'2 ' It is especially devastating for the judicial
system to "add the judiciary's own special imprimatur of legitimacy on
the symbolism of women's dependency."20 2 Instead, the courts should
display "judicial sensitivity to the impact of legislative symbolism on any
person's sense of first-class citizenship, on any person's sense of individu-
ality, independence and self-worth."2"3 In cases like Allyn and Bobb, in
which the state's interest is insubstantial or nonexistent, the lack of sub-
stance behind the disparate treatment heightens the symbolic impact of
the governmental action. 2' In light of that heightened symbolism, the
refusal of one or more judges to take a complaint seriously is an addi-
tional insult.20 5 The California justices in effect told "the Allyn plaintiffs
to go away and stop bothering them with trifles,"20 6 much as Justice
Rouse discounted Bobb's reaction to a few "innocuous questions."
A 1971 study concluded that "the performance of American judges
in the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging
from poor to abominable.""2 7 Many judges have failed to apply to this
issue the "detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served
them so well with respect to other sensitive social issues. '208 The study
detected a pattern of "flagrant judicial insensitivity"2 ' 9 that permits or
encourages an all-too-pervasive reinforcement of group stereotypes.210
The authors of the study found several reasons for the failure of male
judges to perceive the harmful effects of sex discrimination: (1) lack of
knowledge about the injurious effects of sex discrimination; (2) close per-
sonal association with women who may appear to be satisfied with their
200. Id. at 551 n.22 (discussing Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIsT 475, 493
(1968)).
201. Karst, supra note 199, at 552.
202. Id. at 552. See also Stan, Can Justice Survive Bias on the Bench?, Ms. MAGAZINE,
Feb. 1984, at 19:
In the continuing fight for equality, the courts are often the final ground upon which
women battle for their rights. But even there, they often confront judges with stereo-
typed images of women. According to New York attorney Lynn Hecht Schafran,
"Discrimination against women is the last publicly acceptable form of discrimination
in our country." She contends that sexist attitudes still abound in the nation's courts.
203. Karst, supra note 199, at 552-53.
204. Id. at 553.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 555.
207. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 42, at 676.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 697.
210. Id. at 740.
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roles; (3) personal attitudes (prejudices, fears); (4) inability to engage in
empathy because of sex-role socialization; and (5) hostility to change,
especially fundamental change in basic institutions.211 In order to com-
bat these forces, judges must avoid the temptation to dismiss claims that
appear at first blush to lack substance, learn to empathize with a variety
of female points of view, and educate themselves about stereotypes. 212 It
is important that judges, who occupy a special position in our society,213
free themselves from their social conditioning in sex discrimination
cases.
214
B. Beyond Triviality: Toward Greater Equality
Legal challenges to gender-based discrimination can be seen as ef-
forts to enforce the affirmative duty of government "to promote liberty,
equality, and dignity. ' 215 Women who seek the right to register to vote
without disclosing marital status or the right, as prospective jurors, not
to be subjected to discriminatory questioning based on traditional as-
sumptions of women's dependence on men are seeking these objectives.
They are not trivial goals.
"[A]bstractly equal status in terms of legal doctrine" is not
enough.216 Women and members of other suspect classes need equal pro-
tection of the laws in the small but telling symbolic matters that bear on
morale and psyche. When Mary Hamilton insisted that she be addressed
as "Miss Hamilton" rather than "Mary," she sought recognition of her
dignity and independence.217 Like Carolyn Bobb, she found herself held
in contempt of court.21 8 Both Hamilton and Bobb received equal protec-
tion of the laws at the hands of appellate judges who looked beyond the
apparently trivial.
Perhaps the Equal Protection Clause attained a "new respectabil-
ity" '219 in the decades during which the strict scrutiny standard devel-
oped, but effective use of the clause awaits the full cooperation of a
judiciary whose members are able to distinguish triviality from symbol-
ism. Strict scrutiny is an important aspect of equal protection in gender-
211. Id. at 741-44.
212. Id. at 745.
213. "[I]ndividual rights do not get protected by majorities or by elected representatives
... . The judiciary... mediate[s] between the state and the individual." J. BAER, supra
note 85, at 282.
214. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 42, at 747.
215. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 93 (1966).
216. Id. at 108.
217. 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963), rev'd sub nom. Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S.
650 (1964).
218. Id.
219. Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1067
(1969).
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based discrimination cases, but a threshold sensitivity to subtle assaults
on dignity is a vital prerequisite to such scrutiny.
Conclusion
Justice Miller, relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the California
Constitution, applied the strict scrutiny standard mandated by California
decisions based upon independent state grounds. Consequently, Justice
Miller voted to reverse Carolyn Bobb's contempt conviction. Presiding
Justice Kline avoided the equal protection issue by choosing to focus, not
on women's rights, but on jurors' rights.. He did find in Bobb's favor, but
his opinion fashioned a form of redress limited to individual cases. By
ignoring the discriminatory context of the questions, Justice Kline placed
a heavy burden on victims of discrimination and did not confront the
discrimination itself. Justice Rouse also failed to recognize or confront
the implicit discrimination in the municipal court judge's questioning of
the female jurors. Justice Rouse was unable to see beyond a world in
which women discuss husbands and their occupations at "social affairs,
various agencies in the private and public sectors, and even in the court-
room.""22 His belief that the questions were innocuous placed an inap-
propriate burden on Bobb to show that she was sufficiently
disadvantaged to meet his standard.22'
"Virtually strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reaction-
ism, long frustrated by judicial neglect, the theory of equal protection
may yet take its rightful place in the unfinished Constitutional struggle
for democracy., 222 The unfinished struggle for democracy includes the
eradication of gender-based discrimination. Strict scrutiny of such dis-
crimination is essential in effecting that eradication, but no degree of
scrutiny will avail if the eyes that scrutinize cannot see. Thus, the strug-
gle also demands judges who can see-and have the courage to con-
front-the constitutional dimension of seemingly trivial affronts to
human dignity.
220. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 875-76, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
221. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
222. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 71, at 381.
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